Missing Basic Issues on Credit Money: On the Role of Money in Removing World-wide Growth Barriers by Herbert Schui
The Pakistan Development Review 





The M. L. Qureshi Memorial Lecture 
 
 
Missing Basic Issues on Credit Money: On the  






Kalecki identifies demand restraint in industrialised and capital restraint in 
developing countries as the decisive barriers of world-wide growth.  Thus, beyond others, 
it is a matter of financing to foster employment in both types of countries: a rational use 
of credit money on the international scale could finance additional imports of capital 
goods by developing countries, whereas industrialised countries could increase their 
output by trade balance surpluses.   This question has been largely debated under various 
aspects, from the Stamp plan (1958) to the programme of the Commission on 
International Development Issues (1980).  Even if this  debate has been  superseded by  
questions  of the process and the institutions  by which capital  is allocated,  of the 
appropriate business management and screening  and monitoring, declining  growth rates 
in the last twenty years  show that  the basic issue of production  and distribution of 
additional real capital   remains  at stake.   Besides institutional obstacles, capital restraint  
still remains the main  bottleneck for development.  Basic questions as how to create and 
use world-wide credit money has to be reconsidered instead of taking backfiring actions 
to manage actual financial crises. Additional international money supply by planned trade 
balance deficits of developing countries contributes to world-wide growth, whereas trade 
balance deficits of the United States are likely to prepare the next financial crises by an 
excessively increasing dollar supply.  A revival of the debate of how to link SDR’s  and 
development  financing  surely requires to tackle a great number  of additional questions, 
such as how to allocate trade balance  deficits  and surpluses  and how to ensure the 
acceptance of this world credit money.  All in all, it would be a serious attempt to break 
the money away from the handing down tradition and to transform it into a rationale by 
abstract reasons and well-founded instrument for economic development. 
 
1.  THE COEXISTENCE OF CAPITAL AND DEMAND RESTRAINT 
Welfare in developing countries is an issue of employment and labour 
productivity, which both depend on capital formation: the capital stock has to grow 
to create more employment opportunities and to increase capital intensity. Hence, the 
classical question of capital formation remains the crucial point in the debate of 
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economic development. Statistical evidence shows that in the last twenty years, less 
progress has been made than before: in developing countries taken as a whole, the 
average growth rate fell around two-thirds as compared with the sixties; this slow-
down is accompanied by a marked fall in capital formation. This is not inconsistent 
with observations according to which a certain number of developing countries 
realised a marked increase in labour productivity due to capital deepening [Kumar 
and Russel (2002), p. 536].  If output per worker increases due to capital deepening, 
and if, furthermore, employment and economic growth is as low as the investment 
ratio, then investment has been used to create some ‘world-class’ firms—many of 
them subsidiaries of multinationals—[Ocampo (2002), p. 404]. But net capital 
formation was too low to allow for more employment.  
Thus, the situation in developing countries has not improved in principle: 
capital restraint remains the barrier to economic development. Apparently, the 
catching-up process has experienced a setback during the last two decades, which are 
marked by an increase in free world-wide trade and capital movement. Apparently, 
“the longest-lasting episodes of rapid growth in the developing world (…) did not 
coincide with phases of extensive liberalisation”. Neo-classic hope—that under 
conditions of a more perfect international market the higher marginal productivity of 
capital in developing countries would automatically attract real capital—has not been 
fulfilled. This disappointment has led to the following alternative explications: 
Liberalised markets fail because of (1) inadequate institutional development or 
human capital or (2) a lack of full-fledged ‘mesoeconomic policies’ such as active 
competition policies, the correction of market failure in the markets for long-term 
capital, technology, labour training, and the like [Ocampo (2002), p. 400]. These 
explanations, even if the one or the other is true, raise a more fundamental question: 
obviously it is extremely difficult to fulfil condition (1) or (2) so that liberalised 
markets develop their full efficiency. As experience shows, the international 
economic order of the after-war period (when developing and  industrialised 
countries performed better) required conditions for their functioning which were 
easier to accomplish. Thus there are in fact reasons enough to rethink the whole body 
of development strategies and—from a theoretical point of view—to put the old 
questions once more. It is surely important, as a lot of recent literature in the above 
context does, to analyse “the process and institutions by which capital is allocated” 
[Stiglitz (1989), p. 55], but before doing so, it is worthwhile to come back to the 
traditional topics of surplus and accumulation, and in particular of financing. In 
detail this means to answer the questions, whether there is a world-wide (potential) 
surplus enough to alleviate capital scarcity in developing countries and whether there 
is a mode of rational financing of accumulation by credit money. That there is 
potential, but not produced surplus, is illuminated by the fact that industrialised 
countries experienced a similar cut-back in economic performance as the developing 
countries. Issues of Credit Money and Growth 
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In his noteworthy article, “The Difference between Crucial Economic 
Problems of Developed and Underdeveloped Non-socialist Economies”, Kalecki 
(1993) summarises that the main obstacle for economic growth in industrialised 
countries is the lack of effective demand. In contrast to this, in developing countries 
the classical capital restraint remains the principal barrier for growth. This need for 
real capital stands for potential demand, which could increase output and 
employment in industrialised countries, and thus their production of surplus. This 
increase of output in the form of capital goods, if exported to developing countries, 
would enlarge their capital stock. Thus capital and  demand restraint could be 
removed at one stroke: an increasing production of investment goods solves the 
general unemployment question by more effective demand in the industrialised 
countries and by capital formation in the developing countries.  
To specify the question, it is worthwhile to discuss briefly where the demand 
restraint in industrialised countries stems from and how, if at all, policy tries to settle 
the question. When discussing the under-consumption theory of Hobson, Keynes 
argues that Hobson “laid too much emphasis (…) on under-consumption leading to 
over-investment, in the sense of unprofitable investment, instead of explaining that a 
relatively weak propensity to consume helps to cause unemployment by requiring and 
not receiving the accompaniment of a compensating volume of new investment, which, 
even if it may occur sometimes temporarily through errors of optimism, is in general 
prevented from happening at all by the prospective profit falling below the standard set 
by the rate of interest” [Keynes CW VII (1973), p. 370]. The weak propensity to 
consume in turn depends, among other factors, on “the principles on which the income 
is divided between the individuals” [Keynes CW VII (1973), p. 91)], or, more 
precisely: “People’s propensity to spend (as I call it) is influenced by many factors 
such as the distribution of income, their normal attitude to the future and—the 
probability in a minor degree—by the rate of interest” [Keynes CW XIV (1973), p. 
119]. In terms of classical political economy, the underlying question is best described 
by the relation between the forces of production and of the mode of production: 
productive forces have led to a high labour productivity and hence to a high surplus per 
worker, but the state of technical development prevents a part of potential full 
employment surplus from being absorbed and thereby produced in the form of 
investment goods. (Schumpeter called it decreasing investment opportunities). The 
outcome is the production of less than potential surplus, which means less than full 
employment surplus, which in turn is synonymous with unemployment. The solution 
could be found in diminishing full employment surplus by increasing profit taxes or 
wages—in order to increase mass consumption. (One form of more mass consumption 
is the welfare state). In principle, the mode of production conflicts with such a change 
in income distribution: the required distribution can only be realised by political forces 
such as parliaments or trade unions—and not by market forces. Policy is also required 
to increase investment demand by a low rate of interest. This, too, interferes with 
income distribution: it decreases the income of the rentiers.  Herbert Schui 
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If income policy in favour of mass consumption is not at stake, a solution can 
be found by replacing the required investment expenditures “by government 
expenditure which is financed by loans, so that no reduction of any incomes by 
taxation is involved” [Kalecki (1993), p. 14].  The solution is a sort of financial trick. 
This financial trick concerns, in the first instance, the traditional deficit spending, but 
it is obvious that trade balance deficits of the foreign sector lead to the same result 
for the domestic economy of industrialised countries. This implies two basic 
questions: (1) Are balance-of-trade deficits a positive issue for developing countries 
or is free and balanced trade sufficient for economic development? (2) How to 
finance, if at all, trade balance deficits of developing countries? 
 
2.  WORLD-WIDE GROWTH AS LED BY 
  INDUSTRIALISED COUNTRIES 
When Stiglitz (2002, p. 51) describes the working of international monetary 
institutions, he qualifies their policy various times as “ideologically motivated 
measures”, as “market economy fundamentalism” and the like. The main feature of 
modern market fundamentalism is its extreme addiction to unregulated commodity 
and financial markets, and by this the disregard of basic facts in the area of 
macroeconomics. One of these facts is that in practice free trade has fostered the 
already existing tendency towards north-south trade. Even in the ideal case, where 
export revenues of developing countries are entirely used to import capital goods 
(which, in practice, is not the case because of the debt service), the speed of capital 
formation and growth in these countries is determined by the economic growth in 
industrialised countries, which is restricted by insufficient demand. This restriction 
transfers the demand restraint of industrialised countries as barrier of growth into 
developing countries. If it is not removed, free trade simply fosters world-wide 
competition, without expanding, in the longer run, the export market for developing 
countries. Only in the short run, free trade can alleviate the capital restraint: it only 
increases the market share of developing countries on a restricted market. And even 
this is not certain. If there is cut-throat competition amongst developing countries, 
export income will not grow because of falling prices. This possible result has to be 
added to political obstacles for free trade: it is used as a weapon in distribution 
disputes. Thus it contributes to keep down wages in industrialised countries, and 
thereby effective demand and growth. And beyond this, growing segments of public 
opinion see developing countries as responsible for low wages and unemployment. 
The reaction very often is an alliance between threatened business and workers, 
followed by government-imposed tariffs, quotas, and the like.  
Thus, even if there is a strong belief in the advantages of free trade, the 
prerequisite for its success is not only an open but also a continuously increasing 
market. This means higher growth in industrialised countries. Consequently, the 
traditional question of how to come to more growth in these countries remains on the Issues of Credit Money and Growth 
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agenda, i.e., (1) increasing consumption along the line of Keynes’ determinants of 
the propensity to consume by interfering with the income distribution—this was the 
after-war solution, or (2) solving the problem by deficit expenditures, which is the 
rather sporadic and unsystematic actual approach. Under given conditions, world 
economic growth depends to a great extent on U.S. foreign deficits. The 
corresponding trade balance surplus of, mainly, industrialised countries then fosters 
world-wide growth. The financing of these deficits is assured as long as the US 
dollar is accepted as international money. But critics are right in saying that from a 
certain point on, cumulated U.S. deficits will end in a dollar crisis with the common 
effects on real economy. Although these deficits, uptil now, create world-wide 
output, they are absurd because they do not reflect a necessary division of labour; 
most of the excessive imported goods could easily be produced by the US herself. 
This raises the question, whether instead deficits as international growth incentives 
should be realised by developing countries, which are in urgent need of real capital 
and which are not able to produce it themselves.  
Developing countries dispose of a smaller range of possibilities to finance 
trade balance deficits: direct investment linked with capital import (no increase in 
external debt) or credit. International indebtedness is a matter of serious risks. Debt 
service depends on export, which in turn is mainly determined by the growth of 
industrialised countries.
1 Direct investment as the non-debt creating form of capital 
formation has its well-known disadvantages such as the loss of national sovereignty 
or uncontrolled outflow of surplus. Moreover, under the regime of demand restraint, 
other objections have to be added. Given restricted world-wide markets, direct 
investment often takes the form of buying existing firms and thereby markets (very 
often former state enterprises) instead of building up new production capacities. 
Thus it is doubtful whether direct investment supports research and development in 
the host countries, albeit it may improve labour productivity by modernising the 
firms in question, which means creating highly productive islands without backward 
linkages.  
 
1The years after 1979 are a good example for this realisation problem. At the end of the Carter 
administration, the beginning cyclical downswing in the USA was accompanied by a policy of extremely 
high interest rates. (The justification for this was to fight inflation, but also to lower wages by a 
revaluation of the Dollar. —Economic Report of the President 1983, p. 59). The consequence was a long 
and very marked downswing—in the USA as well as in the other industrialised countries, which followed 
the US example. By this, export markets for developing countries shrank, whereas high interest rates 
increased the debt service [Schui (1988), p. 20].  To make matters worse for oil-importing indebted 
countries, the oil price rose in this period. There are good reasons to suppose that the former Shah 
government of Iran as a close ally of the USA had made a special effort that the price increase was higher 
than initially planned by OPEC countries; in the 1980s oil companies made the most of the strikes in 
Iran— the oil exports of this country declined sharply in this period—and of the oil reserve policy of the 
USA—as they increased their reserves during this time instead of selling oil to stabilise prices. OPEC then 
followed with price increases to appropriate a part of the growing profit of oil companies [Terzin (1983), 
p. 231, p. 311]. Herbert Schui 
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International indebtedness as well as direct investment are, if at all, second-
best solutions to accelerate accumulation in developing countries. This leads to the 
question if modern credit money could be used to foster accumulation in developing 
countries. The monetary solution is to finance trade balance deficits of developing 
countries by money creation in order to increase their import of capital goods. This 
would contribute to increasing the world-wide demand and output. Developing 
countries would take over the role of the United States in leading international 
economic growth. The analysis of this issue is, in the first instance, a question of 
clear understanding of the nature of modern credit money and its objective function. 
Or in other words: Can we imagine a rational international monetary system which 
contributes to removing the barriers of growth in developing as well as in 
industrialised countries? If such a draft is possible, we can obtain criteria to judge the 
effectiveness of the international monetary system with respect to this objective. This 
may help to review international monetary policy, carried out by the monetary 
institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and various creditor clubs. 
 
3.  THE OUTLINES OF A RATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM 
The first coherent draft for a rational monetary system to meet the 
requirements of capitalist accumulation stems from John Law (1705).
2  L a w ’ s  
system is a serious attempt to break the money away from tradition, from the 
directness in the sense of the non-abstract understanding of money as having a value 
in itself, and to transform it into a rational instrument for economic development. 
The outlines of Law’s draft are as follows: the parliament of the absolutist state 
installs a commission as bank of issue and a controlling committee. The commission 
supplies paper money according to the demand of the landowners, i.e., the owners of 
the prevailing means of production at this stage of economic development. A cross-
entry comes into being as a loan, which may be paid off by paper money whenever 
desired. The loans are interest-bearing—to prevent landowners from making non-
productive expenditures. The interest is public income. 
The important aspect of Law’s paper money is less historical than analytical. 
It shows the basic properties of credit money in a one-step banking system, with 
bank credit as the only means of financing investment. Basically, Law’s outline of a 
monetary system as the precondition for economic dynamics is identical to 
Schumpeter’s ideas of the role of money and credit. Thus, his comment on Law is 
very positive: “(...) one great plan was behind all this, in fact well-advanced in the 
 
2Law’s paper money was first introduced in France late in the reign of Louis XIV at the end of the 
Spanish war of secession. It failed mainly for reasons of confidence: before Law’s money, French 
government issued another type of paper money during wartime, which served as a means of payment to 
French troops in France. But the state authorities did not accept this money to pay taxes. Voltaire’s 
comment on Law’s money was positive, but he remarks that this paper money should have been 
introduced in times of prosperity in order to stand firm in an unhappy time [Voltaire (1881), p.  411]. Issues of Credit Money and Growth 
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road to success: the plan of controlling, reforming, and leading on to new levels the 
whole of the national economy of France. This is what makes Law’s ‘system’ the 
genuine ancestor of the idea of managed currency, not only in the obvious sense of 
that term but in the deeper and wider sense in which it spells management of 
currency and credit as a means of managing the economic process” [Schumpeter 
(1959), p. 322]. 
From this basis the main characteristics of a rational monetary system can 
be derived. (1) In the first instance, credit money is purely national money, the 
purpose of which is to put domestic economic resources into use. It replaces 
commodity money and cuts financing off the supply of precious metals, the 
production (or the import) of which absorbs domestic resources. It should be noted 
that—from the angle of a country, the currency of which is not international 
money—foreign currency is equivalent to commodity money. Hence, if local 
currency is freely convertible currency, the freedom to select between financing by 
credit in local or international currency may cause an avoidable loss of domestic 
resources by debt service. Free trade of goods and (financial) services should be 
reviewed under this aspect, too. It follows that the international coexistence of 
different local credit moneys requires careful international management. (2) The 
rate of interest is a means of allocation, which is administered by public 
authorities. Its existence is a characteristic of a price-controlled system. Thus the 
logic of interest is its quality to be a price for credit as a licence to use resources. 
This price has prohibitive properties. The scarcer the resources, the higher the 
price. This involves the question of information. If monetary authorities mainly 
administer the rate of interest, it may be concluded that the trust in the market for 
generating information is low. (Note that even monetarists do not trust in the 
market forces when fixing the quantity of money by political institutions.) (a) 
Under the regime of capital restraint, the level of the rate of interest has to ensure 
that all these economic resources, which are not used for consumption, are put into 
use for the production of capital goods. This includes also forced saving as set off 
by monetary means. Accumulation thus is not limited by any shortage of financing 
(for instance by an inadequately high rate of interest), but by the availability of 
physical resources. This contrasts with a regime of pure commodity money: here 
the stock of precious metals, the readiness to coin it, and further hoarding and 
liquidity preference of the money owners, i.e., their readiness to contract at the 
credit market, decide the credit supply and hence accumulation, which all in all 
does not provide adequate information on the scarcity of physical resources. To a 
certain extend this is also true for international lending. It is not unlikely that 
foreign credit supply is subject to the same restrictions as atavistic lending of 
commodity money. (b) Under the regime of demand restraint, the rate of interest 
has to ensure “the financial trick” to bridge the gap between full employment 
output and insufficient effective demand. In this case, its allocation function is not 
to reconcile scarce resources with the need for real capital but to encourage Herbert Schui 
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investment expenditures and to allow for public deficit spending at a low debt 
service. In this case, the rate of interest has to be low and even zero: if investment 
at a zero interest rate does not bridge the gap, there is no reason why public debt 
should bear a positive rate of interest. In terms of time preference, resources left 
idle at a zero interest rate mean that there is no social preference for present 
consumption for which compensation is needed. (3) Interest payment is a rent. 
With commodity money, it reflects  the scarcity of credit and not of physical 
economic resources. Money owners appropriate it. Thus it stems from property of 
money and not from property of physical economic resources. With a rational 
credit money, interest as an active means of resource allocation remains 
necessarily a positive rent as long as physical resources are scarce. But as interest 
is neither a reward for waiting and abstinence—saving is not determined by 
interest—nor a reward for forsaken liquidity—the creation of credit money can 
compensate for any hoarding—interest payment can be appropriated by public 
administration.
3  This implies that monetary authorities can generate information. 
If not, private credit supply, and by this private appropriation of interest payment, 
is unavoidable to generate information. In this case, private interest income is a by-
product of the information-generating process. The rent quality of interest 
generates rent-seeking. This explains the pronounced interest of international 
financial institutions in free movement of capital and free service transactions. (4) 
The appropriation of interest payment as public income requires the non-existence 
of securities as alternative means of credit financing and a one-step banking 
system. If these conditions are not fulfilled, the competition amongst banks for 
deposits and between the bank credit market and the security market will 
necessarily be followed by interest payments to depositors and security owners: in 
this case public authorities and the private sector share the interest income. (5) 
Credit has to be a reliable means of financing expenditures. For creditors, but in 
particular for debtors, it is extremely important that financing is secure. This does 
not only concern projects under way, but also the continuous financing of 
investment at a suitable rate of interest. In the case of capital restraint, suitability 
means, as mentioned above, that accumulation does not fail because of prohibitive 
credit costs. Reliability also means that there is widespread credit supply, which 
includes smaller investment projects and remote areas. This is important for 
backward linkages and a well-structured development. 
  
 
3As long as in a pre-capitalist formation there is no systematic accumulation, there is no need for 
interest to ensure the entire use of physical resources. With consumer credit, the allocation function of 
interest concerns only the redistribution of consumption goods amongst different individuals or social 
groups. Then the readiness to borrow and to pay interest is often enough the result of the threat of 
starvation. Hence canonical prohibition of interest as endorsed by Islamic divines or by Thomas Aquinas 
is a —well-founded—moral issue. If in a price-controlled system interest is unavoidable, moral standards 
with respect to undesired effects on distribution could, among other means, be maintained by the 
appropriation of interest payment by public authorities. Issues of Credit Money and Growth 
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4.  THE MAIN FALLACIES OF THE EXISTING FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
At present, the discussion of international finance and lending deals less with 
“macro-economic co-ordination as stressed in the earlier development literature, but 
with microeconomic problems of selecting (quite specific) projects and choosing 
good managers to manage these projects.” So emphasis is given “to channel funds to 
the most profitable opportunities (the selection or screening function) and to ensure 
that those funds are well used (the monitoring function)” [Stiglitz (1989), p. 66]. 
This is certainly of importance, but emphasis should also be given to the short- and 
the long-term aspect of profitability. Furthermore, the production and the 
appropriation of surplus have to be discussed. This is decisive, if the market structure 
does not allow that surplus is appropriated where it is produced. (These externalities 
are in particular likely for public investment: the estimate of overall benefit of an 
investment should be included).  [Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)]. After all, there “is no 
clear evidence from experience that the investment policy which is socially 
advantageous coincides with that which is most profitable” [Keynes CW VII (1973),  
p. 157].  This leads to two more questions of particular interest: (1) Do the criteria of 
financing of a project correspond with the basic grounds for free trade? And (2) is 
there a systematic difference between financing a private investment project, on the 
one hand, and a country’s economy as a whole, on the other hand?  
The first point concerns the fact that Ricardo’s criterion for foreign trade is 
comparative advantage. Thus, there is a rationale not to select only projects with 
absolute cost advantages. Will international financial investors allocate their funds 
according to this criterion? Or are there good reasons for them to choose the project 
with the absolutely lowest costs and highest profitability? And further, if they do so, 
is there a reliable financing of a firm’s and a country’s economy?  
If solvency, credit worthiness, and a renewed access to international financial 
markets is at stake, it has to be considered that countries do not go out of business as 
firms do.
4 “They may be happy or unhappy with their economic performance, but 
they have no well-defined bottom line. As a result, the concept of national 
competitiveness is elusive” [Krugman (1997), p. 6].  Not only this, the concept of 
credit worthiness is elusive, too, because the criteria for the international financier to 
 
4Similarities exist when neo-classic is treating the labour market. If the full employment wage rate 
(i.e., the corresponding marginal productivity of labour) is too low even to make a bare living, starvation 
of the overpopulation is the only issue, if there is no social security. A negative income tax is proposed to 
prevent starvation. Something similar is provided for nations as a whole in the form of, for instance, 
structural adjustment facilities of the IMF or low-interest loans of the World Bank and its affiliates. The 
price for this stand-by is the de facto surrender of the state sovereignty in economic affairs to international 
financial institutions. The treating of the unemployed in industrialised countries is not unlike: by 
struggling for a job they have to prove continuously with sufficient servility that they are worthy poor. It 
would surely be interesting to continue this reasoning by trying to predict whether and how long the 
unemployed, and those whose (flexible) wages and social benefits show a marked downward tendency, 
will accept this loss of livelihood—and dignity. Herbert Schui 
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provide or to withdraw his funds are rational for him, but not necessarily with respect 
to economic performance of the country in question. Consequently, there are two 
objections against free private international lending: a nation is not an enterprise and 
the aim and rationality of the borrower and the lender are not identical, even if 
financial crises are often hailed as the objective judgement and severe punishment of 
the market, as a means of education for obstinate governments and politicians. It is 
Keynes who has very clearly described what the very ground of the market reaction 
in financing is. To avoid losses on financial markets with flexible prices for equities, 
foreign currency and the like, the essential objective for the financial investor is not 
simply to be informed about the economic performance (the profitability) of the firm 
or the country, but in particular to know the assessment of other investors. Even 
secure information of good performance is no reason to finance or to maintain 
financing, if others believe the contrary. Another reason for withdrawing funds is a 
change in the rank of the project in question, even if its absolute performance 
remains unchanged.  
Keynes describes this circumstance with the following metaphor: 
“(P)rofessional investment may be linked to these newspaper competitions in which 
the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces from a hundred photographs, 
the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly corresponds to 
the average preference of the competitors as a whole; so that each competitor has to 
pick, not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those which he thinks 
likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of whom are looking at the 
problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of choosing those which, to the 
best of one’s judgement, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average 
opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest” [Keynes CW VII (1973), p. 156]. 
Surely, this can be elaborated in a more sophisticated way in terms of 
likelihood, dilemmas, and the like, but the mere basis remains the metaphor above. 
Thus, there is no reason for trust in the information-creating capacity of the market: 
with respect to economic performance, the judgement of the market is rather 
arbitrary. Common theory is debating this outcome in terms of global public goods 
or externalities, which could, among other matters, lead to an analysis of alternative 
mechanisms—so as to supply them in appropriate amounts [Kruger (1998), p. 2005]. 
Besides this liturgical terminology of modern economics, it is the point for policy. 
“The introduction of a substantial government transfer tax on all transactions might 
prove the most serviceable reform available, with a view to mitigating the 
predominance of speculation (…)” [Keynes CW VII (1973), p. 160].  So why not the 
Tobin tax, as actually claimed by anti-globalisation movements like “attac”? The 
main obstacle surely is that such a rule would restrict the opportunities of 
international financial investors. Apparently, the advantages of credit money as 
briefly outlined at the outset require that this money be embedded in a system of 
institutions and rules. Only then can it develop its advantages such as the Issues of Credit Money and Growth 
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independence of credit supply on hoarding, on the production or the import of gold 
(as equivalent to foreign currency), i.e., its quality to be the adequate financial means 
for economic development. These necessary rules are in conflict with the interest of 
financial business. The underlying ground is that price-governed economies need the 
rate of interest as a means of allocation, that interest payment is a rent, and that 
obviously there is a common interest of the financial sector to appropriate this rent as 
private income. Hence there is competition amongst the various financial institutions 
for this rent: freely convertible currency and free trade of services describe in this 
context the desire of foreign financial investors to participate in the rent allocation of 
a country.  
In principle, the inadequate management of modern credit money causes the 
shortcomings of the existing world monetary system. As already outlined, the 
purpose of credit money is to enable investment (here on the international scene) up 
to the point where all physical resources are under use. In this context, adequate 
financing means more effective demand, and by this the creation of income and 
saving—if there are no impediments in the realm of social institutions organising 
accumulation; furthermore adequately skilled labour, and the like. But experience of 
the last half-century obviously shows that the monetary system to finance investment 
and the institutions to carry out accumulation are interrelated with each other. The 
period of more intensive political regulations apparently went hand in hand with the 
building up of adequate institutions for development—but the present institutions 
with their specificity to finance and to manage international indebtedness and to 
organise accumulation (the emphasis of the private sector, the importance of 
multinationals herein) do not do this. Under the aspect of financing, the main reason 
for this failure is that the level of interest does not reflect the scarcity of physical 
capital but the readiness to contract at the credit market, which in turn is determined 
by the estimates of professional financial investors according to their rationality. The 
role of the state in development and the need for financing development is rather 
disregarded; the narrow sense of private investor’s profitability leads to ignore the 
long run, to neglect the necessity of backward linkages. The analysis of how to come 
to a well-balanced development in all facets of the economy, including forestry and 
agriculture to assure feeding, sheltering, and clothing by the generation, or the use of 
domestic resources, which could alleviate pressure on trade balance, is replaced by 
hailing the forces of a free markets.  
 
5.  THE MISMATCH OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 
AND EXTERNALITIES 
When Knapp (1905) calls money a creature of the legal system, he is right 
insofar as credit money as an artefact requires public administration, which in the 
first instance is limited by the range of state authority. This range is determined by 
state territory, but also by the capacity to manage credit money adequately—which is Herbert Schui 
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jeopardised by internal and  external factors, such as IMF conditionality. The 
territorial aspect confines credit money in the national realm. The international 
functioning of credit money requires agreements of states. As long as these 
agreements are imperfect or inadequate relative to the nature of credit money, the 
rational solution for an individual state is to use its local currency for development 
whenever possible and to make a sharp distinction between local and foreign 
currency. This is not to advocate autarky, but to argue for an international legal 
system to administer international credit money.  
In any case, national development requires careful consideration so that 
domestic resources can be mobilised by local currency, and foreign credit by 
unavoidable. This involves once more the question of saving and financing. As 
financing enables investment, which in turn creates income and savings, it is not 
precise to say that financial institutions “collect” savings to make possible the 
financing of investment. As financing creates savings, mobilising domestic resources 
creates domestic savings, and financing by local currency avoids losses of the 
domestic economy in the form of interest payment. To come close to this goal, 
national monetary policy must be sovereign enough to fix the rate of interest at a 
sufficiently low level—without fearing capital outflow and undesired devaluation. 
For example, if an entrepreneur plans to build a new hall and if construction material 
can be produced by the domestic economy, and if further additional workers can be 
nourished by domestic agrarian production, and if, furthermore, an increase of the 
production of food can be secured by domestic production, then it is not rational to 
raise foreign loans to finance this investment. Or, more specifically, investment 
along the line of the input-output matrices avoids increasing input prices, food 
production included. Thus, low interest rates, an appropriate distribution of credit 
and the encouragement of even small investment (once more the agrarian sector 
included) helps to avoid inflation.
5  
It is evident that private investors do not take into account the implications 
of foreign or domestic lending. With freely convertible currency and the absence 
of capital controls, they tend to cause externalities: if firms are free to choose 
between domestic and foreign credit, the domestic central bank with its currency 
 
5The writings of Kaldor (1978) and Kalecki (1993) give a good insight into what the dominant 
reason for inflation in developing countries is: agrarian production falls behind the growth of the industrial 
sector. A shortage in food, hence increasing prices for livelihood, and by this increasing money wages, 
lead to higher prices in the industrial sector, which in turn makes the input for the agrarian sector more 
expensive. A recession as brought about by advice of the IMF dampens inflation by the shortcoming of 
demand for food. As a result, industrial growth is adapted to the low effectiveness of the agrarian sector. 
At bottom this is not an anti-inflationary but an anti-growth policy. High interest rates as further results of 
IMF programmes hinder the agrarian sector to increase its output and productivity. Similar effects occur if 
cash crop production is promoted to foster export and if foreign banks dominate credit supply. These are 
less interested in developing remote agrarian areas. Property in the agrarian sector is another issue. Which 
form of property fosters agrarian output best? Thus the choice may be to maintain large estate holdings or 
to create family-owned farms with an optimal area. Issues of Credit Money and Growth 
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reserves—and not the borrower—is obliged to ensure the debt service in foreign 
currency. If the bank is unable to do so, austerity programmes are likely to 
enforce more exports. Hence the final price for foreign lending may be higher 
than its specific rate of interest. In other words: externalities express in 
retrospect that the relative prices of financing by foreign or domestic credit were 
not exactly expressed by the rates of interest. This is certainly one of the reasons 
why, in “Keynes’ proposals, the Fund would have been able to require countries 
to impose capital controls” [Kruger (1998), p. 1995)]. But these regulations, as 
necessary as they are, do not conform to the abstract logic of globalisation. Thus 
one does not only require freely convertible currency and free services: the more 
the world-wide economy comes closer to a national economy, the higher the 
need for a unique currency and for only one responsible lender of last resort—
and not a variety of currencies within an hierarchy of quickly changing ranks. 
(The history of the European Union shows that economic integration requires, 
from a certain point on, one unique money). Such logical requirement seems to 
be the mere reason for the creation of currency boards. But this arrangement has 
two serious defects: in the case where the US Dollar is the local currency, the US 
Federal Reserve nevertheless does not serve as the lender of last resort for local 
banks; in both cases local banks have to compete for the Dollar which leads to a 
higher rate of interest than in the United States; if investment is more expensive, 
economic activity slows down. Furthermore, international companies realise 
advantages by this arrangement relative to their local competitors. They can use 
their traditional channels for cheaper financing; in addition, in most cases, their 
self-financing is higher. The mere reason for this outcome is that within such a 
mismatched structure, the rate of interest does not fulfil its function, i.e., to 
indicate the scarcity of physical resources. Instead, it informs about the scarcity 
of foreign currency, just as the rate of interest in a commodity money regime 
informs about the scarcity of gold and the readiness of money owners to contract 
at the credit market. In this case, the advantages of credit money are not taken—
in contrast to Schumpeter’s idea of “currency and credit as a means of managing 
the economic process”. 
 
6.  DEVELOPMENT FINANCING BY THE CREATION OF 
     INTERNATIONAL MONEY: THE LINK DISCUSSION 
The formation of real capital by unbalanced trade and its financing by the 
creation of international money is not a new idea: in the last version of his plan for 
international finance of 1943, Keynes provides a method of international money 
management, where, as Keynes writes, “it would be possible to avoid asking any 
country to assume a burdensome commitment for relief and reconstruction, since the 
resources would be provided in the first instance by those countries having clearing Herbert Schui 
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accounts for which they have no immediate use and are voluntarily leaving idle, and 
in the long run by those countries which have a chronic international surplus for 
which they have no beneficial employment” [Horsefield (1969), p. 33]. This was 
certainly the thought for postwar reconstruction, but the outlines can easily be 
generalised for universal development purposes.  Chronic trade balance surplus is 
one remedy for unemployment in industrialised countries; by analogy, relief and 
reconstruction is what developing countries need. Thus it is not surprising that in the 
later years this idea has largely been discussed as the link between special drawing 
rights and development financing. The Stamp-Plan (1958) is the first attempt, 
followed by Triffin (1959); the UNCTAD (1964), and Scitowsky (1965) [see also 
IMF (1985), Vol. I, p. 199, Vol. III, p. 69]. If we dismantle these plans of booking 
procedures and the inclusion of international non-private credit institutions, they 
have one common outline: financial deficits create credit money. For a national 
monetary system, the business sector’s deficit is typically financed by money 
creation, followed by deficits of the state and the foreign sector. An international 
central bank can choose trade balance deficits of developing countries as cross-entry 
for its money creation.  
The creation of this particular international money is not different from the 
principles of credit money creation in general. The peculiarity is that this money 
serves only to finance trade balance deficits of developing countries. The quantity of 
additional money is the object of two restrictions: deficit financing has to be kept in 
line with potential production of industrialised countries or with the capacity of 
developing countries to absorb the imported capital goods. Another serious question 
is the mode of distribution of money (or credit, respectively). In principle, there are 
two modes of allocation: the price, i.e., the rate of interest or the political decisions 
according to quotas that may be determined by a mix of different development 
indicators. But as price mechanism is not in favour of the less developed countries, 
political decisions may be preferred. A further point of decision is the distribution of 
trade balance surpluses. As the purpose of the system is to remove capital and 
demand restraint, trade balance surplus has to be allowed these industrialised 
countries which suffer unemployment. As market mechanism may fail with this 
aspect of allocation, too, once more political decision is necessary. This is a point for 
serious objections: Is there a link between the trade balance of a country and its 
ability to produce high standard capital goods (its competitiveness), or is the deficit 
rather due to a higher growth? In any case, there are good reasons for international 
money management, which includes developing as well as industrialised countries. 
A further questions is: Who or which institution should dispose of the money and 
carry out investment? The state in developing countries, domestic firms, or direct 
investors? (There will be less opposition in industrialised countries if the funds are 
provided for direct investors.) In all cases, the utilisation of the funds has to be 
controlled. But as there is now widespread consent that the IMF has the right to set Issues of Credit Money and Growth 
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up conditions for its assistance and to control their realisation [Driscoll (1998), p. 3], 
the reproach of misallocation can be refuted. A last point concerns the acceptance of 
this special credit money. Two conditions are essential: the money has to be a means 
to settle the exporter’s claim, and central banks have to accept the money as freely 
convertible currency. This raises the question of the exchange rate of this currency: 
as the cross-entry is the currency of developing countries, it is likely that without 
further precautionary measures the new international currency will devaluate. Surely, 
existing international money such as the US dollar is a matter of risk, too. But a new 
money requires more stability than that already existing. And finally, a renewal of 
the link between the SDRs and development financing has to be discussed in the 
context of international indebtedness of developing countries.  
Without any doubt, using money to settle the world-wide unemployment 
question is a formidable task. Given credit money, the choice is to take up the 
challenge of its rational use or to muddle though as the actual management of the 
international currency does. At present, the actions of international monetary 
institutions are rather dominated by the worry of the handling of credit crises and of 
stabilising the status quo by patchwork than by developing solutions on the ground 
through any real or deep understanding of the working of credit money: “The long-
run matters, because policies designed with only short-run problems and 
consequences in mind are all too likely to backfire once the immediate crisis is past” 
[Baumol (1986), p. 1084]. 
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I am grateful to Professor Schui for an insightful paper.  The main idea, if cast 
in a mild form, is uncontroversial, namely, the judicious use of expansionary 
monetary policy in mature economies under conditions of excess capacity can raise 
production and income in these economies, which in turn fosters export-led growth 
in developing  countries, providing  them the foreign  exchange  to expand  their  
productive  capacity.  Indeed, it is for this reason that the IMF, in fulfilment of its 
mandate, at present urges Japan to apply additional monetary stimulus—and to 
implement the banking reforms required to make that stimulus effective.  Cambridge 
School theoreticians of an earlier generation are credited with this insight. 
The paper in front of us, however, will likely stir controversy, because it 
pushes this benign idea towards a more extreme version. Specifically, the paper 
underplays the economic costs of a prolonged overdose of monetary or fiscal 
stimulus. And by ignoring the array of structural reforms that can raise the 
productivity of capital, the paper overrates the role of demand management among 
the tools available for achieving sustained economic growth. 
The one-sidedness of the conclusions follows directly from the highly 
restrictive assumptions of the model elucidated in the paper. Thus, a first 
recommendation to the author would be to make those limiting assumptions explicit. 
The thinking underlying the paper is comparative statics and the horizon is short-
term.  The dictum “in the long run we are all dead” may have been useful in 
underscoring the need for policy reversal in the depths of the Great Depression, but 
ignoring  nowadays the long-term consequences of a string  of large annual  budget 
deficits in the name of pump-priming  or kick-starting  the economy, or of allowing 
public enterprises to lose money indefinitely because they add to physical  capital  
formation, has led to unsustainable  public  debt levels and subsequent  reversal  of 
economic growth. 
Another limiting assumption is that the structure of the economy depicted in 
this paper is frozen over time.  Factories in mature economies cannot migrate to 
developing countries.  Hence, the author’s policy recommendation to increase real 
wages and tax away profits in the mature economies is a means to stimulate 
aggregate demand by redistributing income to social classes with a high propensity 
to consume.  Yet, in today’s world, we see enterprises leave Western Europe 
increasingly for China.  Professor’s Schui’s misgivings about foreign direct 
investment are understandable if industries depart.  Yet most countries vie to receive 
such investments.  Equally, in the model underlying this paper, countries do not 
compete for market share: each economy continues to produce the same single good.  Henri Ghesquière 
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This assumption precludes the welfare gains of opening up the markets of today’s 
rich countries for textiles or agricultural produce from developing countries. Also, 
nowhere in this model is there room for human capital development or for improved 
institutions that raise the productivity of capital or encourage savings or capital 
formation in developing countries. 
In short, the very limitations, in fact otherworldliness, of the assumptions of 
the model lead by design towards exaggerating the relative importance of monetary 
stimulus among the instruments available for fostering economic growth. 
My second suggestion to Professor Schui is to take advantage of available 
empirical evidence. Today, ample econometric evidence refutes the views of 
Nicholas Kaldor and others of several decades ago that attributed inflation in Latin 
America to supply-side constraints.  Granted, adverse shocks to harvests do impact 
overall price levels, but it is excess money supply growth that has been identified the 
world over as the dominant explanatory variable behind prolonged inflation. Equally, 
on IMF-supported economic programmes, detailed information is now available on 
the websites of the IMF and of the governments with whom we work.  Actual 
examination of these stabilisation and economic reform programmes will lead to a 
much more nuanced assessment than the commonly voiced criticisms. Thus, in 
Pakistan, the IMF has supported the recent reduction in interest rates and an increase 
in broad money in excess of nominal GDP growth, allowing the financial sector to 
deepen throughout the IMF programme.  Prudent policy, of course, requires that the 
authorities put in place the regulatory and institutional improvements that will 
expedite the development of sound financial intermediation, and thus underpin 
demand for the growing money supply. 
In conclusion, Central Banks can indeed use money as one among several 
tools that are available to policy-makers in the pursuit of higher economic growth.  
They can do so, by exploiting short-run flexibility in coping with business cycles, but 
only within the confines of monetary discipline aimed at attaining long-term price 
stability, and also by fostering a regulatory environment conducive to sound 
financial intermediation.  The work of the Cambridge School theoreticians, as laid 
out by Dr Schui, makes only a limited contribution nowadays towards the goal of 
sustained economic growth.  By contrast, for that group of earlier economists, to 
their enduring credit, reaching the full potential of the unemployed stood at the 
centre of public policy.   
 
Henri Ghesquière 
International Monetary Fund, 






As a second discussant of this paper my task is relatively easier as Henri has 
already dealt with a number of substantial points in his discussion. 
Professor Schui’s paper “On the Role of Money in Removing World-wide 
Growth Barriers” is a very interesting work which deals with a number of important  
issues in international finance, trade, investment, and  growth, and has considerable 
relevance to the theme of this conference: Regulation, Competition, and Information.    
The starting-point of the paper is the co-existence of capital restraint in the 
developing world and inadequate effective demand, à la Keynes, in industrialised 
countries.  Both of these Schui considers as barriers to economic growth.  Based on 
this simple premise, he asks the question if some imaginative financing in a rational 
international monetary system can solve both these problems simultaneously. 
Based on a two-sector model, in which the advanced countries produce only 
investment goods and the less developed countries (LDCs) produce only consumer 
goods, he maintains that under balanced trade the volume of foreign trade between 
the two groups of countries equals the wage bill of industrialised countries.  This 
wage bill also determines the rate of accumulation in developing countries.  From 
this reasoning, he concludes: 
“It follows that increasing domestic investment of industrialised countries 
increases their wage bill, by this their import of consumer goods, and hence the 
export of developing countries and their import of capital goods”. 
It is therefore argued that a low rate of investment in industrialised countries 
dampens the speed of industrialisation in developing countries.  Furthermore, it is 
maintained that the international division of labour and international trade transfers 
the demand restraints of industrialised countries as barriers of growth to developing 
countries.  All this implies that the low growth in the LDCs is simply a result of 
demand restraint in industrialised countries, and is the main obstacle for 
accumulation in developing countries.  The solution thus can be either through fiscal 
stimulus  à la Keynes, or through expansionary monetary policy in industrialised 
countries.  The author seems to prefer the monetary solution.  The proposal of money 
as credit, or national money and the removal of the link vis-à-vis commodity money 
can be analysed in a traditional macro model.  However, the results envisioned by 
the author may not occur and instead the result may be higher inflation.  Here one 
may think of the recent episode of the so-called Asian Financial crisis and its 
devastating effect. Fakhari A. Siddiqui  442
I find this analysis very problematic on numerous grounds.  First, the outcome 
foreseen would only be possible in the short run, while the question of growth deals 
with the long-run.  Second, the growth in the LDCs is not simply a question of 
physical capital; the development of human capital is of crucial importance.  Third, 
the proposed model completely ignores the price effects and adjustment in the labour 
markets.  Here one can note the huge economic damage that occurred during the 
Asian financial crisis.  Fourth, regarding trade issues between the LDCs and 
advanced countries, the author is sceptical about the potential growth through trade.  
On this point I suggest that the advanced countries must lower tariff- and non-tariff 
barriers on imports from the LDCs.  This benefits both the LDCs and the advanced 
countries.  It is well-established that there are huge economic costs because of such 
barriers and protection.         
Finally, I would like to comment on Dr Schui’s plea regarding the need of 
reform of the international monetary system in a way that promotes capital 
accumulation in the LDCs.  While no one denies that there is always a need to 
improve the domestic and international monetary system, he fails to provide an 
explicit framework for such a system.  In devising any such system one must be 
careful in selecting the criteria for such a system. One could propose three elements: 
confidence, liquidity, and adjustment. 
With reference to the LDCs and liquidity, one can imagine something similar 
to the Stamp-Plan, whereby the new liquidity can simply be passed on to the LDCs 
to meet their trade deficits, which are like foreign investments.  Such a proposal in 
theory is practicable and indeed desirable, but requires acceptance by the advanced 
countries that have not shown much interest in it in the past.  Regarding the issues of 
confidence and adjustment, one could also pose a number of questions, which the 
paper has ignored. 
Finally, the paper is silent on the topic of technical change and productivity, 
which are crucially important if we want to improve wages in the LDCs.  The policy 
implications of the paper are neither practicable nor acceptable in the current 
international environment, where most countries have now rejected expansionary 
fiscal policies entailing deficits. To the degree that deficit financing and 
expansionary monetary policies are not a serious option, the main argument of the 
paper is weakened by proposing them.             
 
Fakhari A. Siddiqui 
Bishop’s University, Quebec, 
Canada.  